1. INTRODUCTION

Chapter II of the now classic book by Bernard Hanotiau on complex arbitrations tries to answer the following question: 'May an Arbitration Clause be Extended to Non-Signatories: Individuals, States or Other Companies of the Group?'. However, the title of the chapter is immediately followed by the title of its first section, which refers doubtfully to 'The so-called group of companies doctrine'. 1 The implication is that such a doctrine is either wrongly named or does not exist. Thus, the question whether a group of companies doctrine is able to provide a solution to the problem of the extension of the effects of an arbitration clause to parties that have not signed the contract concerned appears to be a legitimate one. Beyond the issue of jurisdiction, it is also legitimate to wonder whether a group of companies doctrine may play a role in strictly procedural matters, such as joinders of parties in existing arbitral proceedings or the consolidation of two or more arbitral proceedings.

The concept of a group of companies is well known in financial law and even more so in tax law. Although it is referred to in several arbitration awards and court decisions, few of them give a general definition of this concept, as discussed below. They prefer to affirm the existence of a group of companies on a case-by-case basis and to justify such affirmation by mentioning a number of factual elements, such as one company's control over the other and/or a common management. 2 However, as correctly summarized by Dominique Hascher 3 , a group of companies may be defined as an economic unit with an [Page131:] integrated management, beyond the legal personalities of the companies that belong to it. The economic reality is preferred to the legal organization, but only up to a point. There is no group of companies in the absence of distinct legal entities. This means that, if a branch of a company without legal personality signs an arbitration agreement, the party to that agreement will be the parent company and not the branch, whatever their respective economic size 4 . It takes at least two companies to have a group of companies! Boosted by a number of arbitration awards and court decisions rendered mainly in France, the group of companies doctrine had its moment of glory in the three last decades of the twentieth century, which also witnessed the beginning of its decline (see section 2). Today, there is little doubt that the existence of a group of companies plays a limited role in the decisions of arbitrators and courts dealing with arbitration issues (see section 3).

2. THE REFERENCE TO A GROUP OF COMPANIES IN ARBITRATION CASE LAW

In the 1970s, several arbitral awards were at the origin of the group of companies doctrine. One, issued in Paris in the ICC case No. 2375 in 1975, 5 was bold enough to state that '[t]he autonomy of the international community of businessmen, governed in their mutual relations by specific rules must be acknowledged', and further that 'international commercial companies are beyond the realm of State law'. The award adds that 'the concept of group is defined, beyond the formal independence resulting from the creation of discreet legal persons, by a single economic orientation depending on a common power'. On the basis of this doctrine, the arbitral tribunal found that companies belonging to two groups of companies were bound by or could take advantage of an arbitration clause signed by others companies of their respective group.

In the same year, another ICC award, issued in Geneva in Case No. 1434, 6 came to similar conclusions, stressing that the leader of a multinational group had negotiated an agreement with a state on behalf of a group of companies. The award pointed out that '[…] it is customary in international industrial agreements of that size [that] the State […] deals with a group or a big "multinational" company which, for internal reasons of organization or of opportunity will entrust the performance of the operation to one or several subsidiaries, existing or to be created on an ad hoc basis'. It concluded that, in line with 'economic reality', neither the group nor its chairman or any of its member companies could avoid the extension of the effect of the arbitration agreement to them, unless it was established that such had been the parties' intent.

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However, although it was not the first award using the concept of a group of companies as a basis for deciding that non-signatories to an arbitration agreement were nevertheless a party to that agreement, the Dow Chemical award, 7 issued in Paris in 1982 in the ICC case No. 4131, remains the most famous one. Indeed, it introduced the three constitutive elements of the group of companies doctrine and for this reason deserves to be extensively quoted here:

"[…] irrespective of the distinct juridical identity of each of its members, a group of companies constitutes one and the same economic reality of which the Arbitral tribunal should take account when it rules on its own jurisdiction […].

Considering that the tribunal shall, accordingly, determine the scope and effects of the arbitration clauses in question, and thereby reach its decision regarding jurisdiction, by reference to the common intent of the parties to these proceedings, such as it appears from the circumstances that surround the conclusion and characterize the performance and later the termination of the contracts in which they appear. In doing so, the tribunal, following, in particular, French case law relating to international arbitration should also take into account usages conforming to the needs of international trade, in particular, in the presence of a group of companies […]. Considering, in particular, that the arbitration clause expressly accepted by certain of the companies of the group should bind the other companies which, by virtue of their role in the conclusion, performance, or termination of the contracts containing said clauses, and in accordance with the mutual intention of all parties to the proceedings, appear to have been veritable parties to these contracts or to have been principally concerned by them and the disputes to which they may give rise."

In this award, issued by prominent scholars and arbitrators (professors Pieter Sanders, Berthold Goldman and Michel Vasseur), the arbitral tribunal states firmly at the beginning of its reasoning that a group of companies is an economic factor that must be taken into account by arbitrators when assessing their own jurisdiction, without regard to the respective legal identity of each member of the group. This is the first element of what would become the group of companies doctrine. Then, the award indicates, in the presence of a group of companies, that such an approach is required by the needs of international trade. This is the second constitutive element. The third and most significant one is that the common intent of the parties is to be found in the surrounding circumstances that characterize the conclusion, performance or termination of the contract. The combination of those three [Page133:] elements led to the now well-known principle according to which an arbitration clause signed by certain companies of the group binds the other companies of the group that played a role in the conclusion, performance or termination of the contract containing the clause.

This interim award was the object of a setting-aside procedure before the Paris Court of Appeal, 8 which decided to uphold it. However, it did not grant the concept of a group of companies the importance that the arbitrators had thought it deserved. The main grounds for the decision of the Court of Appeal were:

"The arbitrators for good reasons have observed that the law applicable to determine the scope and effects of an arbitral clause providing for international arbitration does not necessarily coincide with the law applicable to the merits of the dispute.

Following an autonomous interpretation of the agreement and the documents exchanged at the time of their negotiation and termination, the arbitrators have, for pertinent and non-contradicted reasons, decided, in accordance with the intention common to all companies involved, that Dow Chemical France and Dow Chemical Company have been parties to these agreements although they did not actually sign them and that therefore the arbitration clause was applicable to them as well".

The court further noted that: 'The arbitrators have also, by the way, [accessoirement] referred to the notice of "group of companies", the existence of which according to the customs of international trade has not been seriously contested by the defendant'. It is clear that the Paris Court of Appeal was not prepared to follow the arbitrators as far as the effect of the existence of a group of companies was concerned. What was important for the court was the intent of the parties, as revealed by their behaviour and the documents they had exchanged between themselves. In a decision of 26 November 1986 in the Sponsor A.B. case, 9 the Court of Appeal of Pau was not as prudent as the Paris court. It almost entirely reproduced the reasoning, if not the wording, of the Dow Chemical award:

"It is admitted in law that the arbitration clause expressly accepted by companies of the group must bind the other companies which, because of the role they played in the conclusion, performance and termination of the contracts containing those clauses, appear, pursuant to the common intent of all the parties to the proceedings, to have been actual parties to those contracts or to be primarily concerned by them or by the disputes resulting <page nr="134" /> therefrom. Indeed, a group of companies has, in spite of the distinct juridical identity of each of them, a single economic reality that Courts should take into account, its existence being recognized by the usages of international trade […]".

No other French court went that far, with the significant exception of the decision of the Paris Court of Appeal in the Orri case on 11 January 1990, which is discussed below. 10 In subsequent decisions concerning the effect of an arbitration agreement on non-signatories, the Paris Court of Appeal was able to generalize the approach initiated in its judgment in the Dow Chemical case by declaring case after case that:

"an arbitration clause in an international contract has a validity and an effectiveness of its own, such that the clause must be extended to parties directly implicated in the performance of the contract and in any dispute arising out of the contract, provided that it has been established that their respective situations and activities raise the presumption that they were aware of the existence and scope of the arbitration clause, and irrespective of the fact that they did not sign the contract containing the arbitration agreement."

This statement may be found, with very few differences in wording, in decisions of the Paris Court of Appeal of 30 November 1988 and 14 February 1989, 11 28 November 198912 and 11 January 199013 . However, although the Cour de cassation upheld those decisions, it was more prudent in its reasoning, as indicated below.

This consistent case law confirms that the decisive element is the common intent of the parties to be bound by an arbitration agreement. Such a common intent may be implied in the absence of the signature of an arbitration agreement under two conditions: (1) an active role of the non-signatories in the performance of the contract that contains the arbitration agreement and in the disputes arising therefrom; and (2) a presumption that the nonsignatory had knowledge of the arbitration agreement. This prominent role given to the common intent of the parties is part of a substantive rule of French law that French courts apply without any regard to any national law that might be applicable to the arbitration clause pursuant to a conflict of laws rule. It was clearly expressed in the Dalico case of 1993 by the Cour de cassation, which stated that:

"By virtue of a substantive rule of international arbitration, the arbitration agreement is legally independent of the main contract containing or referring to it, and the existence and effectiveness of the arbitration agreement are to be assessed, subject to the mandatory <page nr="135" /> rules of French law and international public policy, on the basis of the parties' common intention, there being no need to refer to any national law."

The above-mentioned solutions are not specific to groups of companies. For instance, the decision of 14 February 1989 was rendered in the completely different context of a charter party. The existence of a group of companies only strengthens the presumption that the non-signatory party had knowledge.

The position of French law was clearly summarized in an unpublished ICC award of 2001 in the case No.11405, quoted by Bernard Hanotiau: 15

"[t]here is no general rule, in French international arbitration law, that would provide that non-signatory parties members of a same group of companies would be bound by an arbitration clause, whether always or in determined circumstances. What is relevant is whether all parties intended non-signatory parties to be bound by the arbitration clause. Not only the signatory parties, but also the non-signatory parties should have intended (or led the other parties to reasonably believe that they intended) to be bound by the arbitration clause […]. The legal literature confirms that what is relevant is whether the non-signatory parties were intended to be bound, rather than a general rule about a group of companies: '[c]learly, however it is not so much the existence of a group that results in the various companies of the group being bound by the agreement signed by only one of them, but rather the fact that such was the true intention of the parties'."

On the basis of the above, one may be tempted to conclude that the group of companies doctrine represented a brief momentum in the evolution of the French case law relating to the application of arbitration clauses to non-signatories.

As a matter of fact, this doctrine has been firmly excluded in other jurisdictions with the apparent exception of Spain. 16 Switzerland is a well known example in this regard as explained by a prominent author: 17

"In short, Swiss law ignores the concept of group of companies […] and is resolutely committed to the legal independence of the company in relation to its sole shareholder or of the subsidiary in relation to the parent company. It will only be disregarded in exceptional circumstances, where the fact of resorting to such a subsidiary to escape one's obligations would amount to fraud or to a patent abuse of right."

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Likewise, an arbitral tribunal constituted under the auspices of the Chambre de commerce et d'industrie de Genève18 pointed out in 2000 that:

"the principle according to which a company may be considered a party to a contractual undertaking made by another company as a consequence of the fact that both companies belong to a group which constitutes one economic reality, does not exist in Switzerland de lege lata. It is therefore not possible to apply here the solutions which were applied in this context by arbitral tribunals in a number of ICC arbitrations."

This position was clearly confirmed by the Swiss Federal Tribunal in a decision of 29 January 199619 , which states that the existence of a group of companies, as such, is not a sufficient ground to find that a company of the group that has not signed an arbitration clause is bound by that clause because it was signed by another member company. In reality, the Swiss view today appears to be very flexible and not so different from the present position of the French courts: on the basis of the surrounding circumstances, Swiss lawyers and courts look for the actual intent of the parties revealed by their 'actes concluants'20 . No such flexibility exists in England. A striking example of the reluctance of English courts to accept that an arbitration agreement may be binding on non-signatories is provided in the Dallah case, where the enforcement in England of an ICC award issued in Paris was refused in 2009, on the grounds that the arbitrators had wrongly applied French law when holding that a non-signatory was party to the arbitration agreement21 . Even though the case did not involve a group of companies but a state, the decision was based on a strict interpretation of the parties' consent that was at odds with the French tradition in this respect.

In the United States, the existence of a group of companies seems to greatly facilitate the decision to declare an arbitration clause signed by members of the group binding on non-signatory members of the group. 22 However, it would not be correct to try to relate the uS approach to the group of companies doctrine as developed in French law. The group of companies doctrine relies on the assumption that the usages of international trade require that all the members of the group that were involved in the negotiation, performance and - where applicable - termination of a contract containing an arbitration clause be bound by this arbitration clause. It is presented as a substantive rule. The concern of the US courts is not substantive but procedural. What matters is the efficiency of the procedure, as illustrated by the decision of the Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit in the Ryan case: 23

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"When the charges against a parent company and its subsidiary are based on the same facts and are inherently inseparable, a court may refer claims against the parent to arbitration even though the parent is not formally a party to the arbitration agreement. […] If the parent corporation was forced to try the case, the arbitration proceedings would be rendered meaningless and the federal policy in favour of arbitration effectively thwarted."

That being said, it does not mean that the group of companies doctrine has lost any practical interest, although its effects are far more limited than previously accepted.

3. THE LIMITED EFFECT OF THE EXISTENCE OF A GROUP OF COMPANIES

As already pointed out in the discussion of the French case law, the existence of a group of companies is a circumstance that plays an important role in revealing the intent of parties (see section a). Beyond the specific issue of the scope of the arbitration clause, the existence of a group of companies is a factor that should also be taken into consideration when deciding whether to order the joinder of a party or consolidate procedures (see section b).

a. The group of companies: an element of the factual matrix Revealing the intent of the parties

It is largely admitted today that the question whether a party is bound by an arbitration agreement essentially depends on the intent of the parties, whether or not they have signed this agreement. The fact that the law applicable to the arbitration agreement may require that it be made in writing, as most national legislations do, is irrelevant. Indeed, signature and writing are two different things. The signature is just one of several means of expressing consent. In the factual matrix where the group of companies doctrine is discussed, there is an arbitration agreement made in writing. The issue at stake is the determination of the parties that consented to this written agreement. Some of them signed it; others did not, but their consent may be proved in many different ways depending on the circumstances. The existence of a group of companies cannot be a neutral fact in this respect. The Kis France case24 provides a good example of the role played by the existence of a group of companies in the assessment by arbitrators and courts of the parties' intent to be bound by an arbitration agreement. The dispute was related to several agreements entered into by various members of two groups of companies: Kiss France and its subsidiaries, on the one hand, and Société Générale and its subsidiaries, on the other. There was an ICC arbitration clause in a framework agreement entered into by Kiss France and [Page138:] Société Générale. Arbitration proceedings were initiated by Société Générale and some of its subsidiaries against Kis France and some of its subsidiaries. The arbitral tribunal retained jurisdiction over all claimants and all respondents and over the various agreements. An action to set aside the award was filed with the Paris Court of Appeal, which upheld the award. Two major grounds for challenging the award were raised. One was that the arbitrators had exceeded their jurisdiction, and the other was that they had not applied French law, as contemplated by the parties' agreement, because they had relied on the usages of international trade to refer to the concept of a group of companies.

As to the second ground for setting aside the award, the Court of Appeal was of the view that, by referring to the usages of international trade to rely on the concept of a group of companies, the arbitrators had respected the scope of their mission. The fact that the court confirmed that the arbitrators could, while applying French law, introduce the usages of international trade in their reasons is not surprising. They are entitled to do so, whatever the applicable law pursuant to Article 1496 of the Code of Civil procedure. What is more interesting is that the court took for granted that the concept of a group of companies was part of the usages of international trade. The spirit of the decision of the Pau Court of Appeal of 1986 in the Sponsor A.B. case is not very far removed from this! 25 But the main interest of the case is not there.

It is in the Court of Appeal's confirmation of the arbitrators' jurisdiction because:

"the arbitrators, on the basis of the interpretation of the parties' conventions […] and considering the domination of the mother companies over their subsidiaries, […] held that there was a common intention of the parties to consider that Kis France [and subsidiaries] were direct debtors of any amount due by themselves or their subsidiaries."

The Paris Court of Appeal used the concept of a group of companies as a basis to extend the scope of the arbitration agreement over a group of contracts. This is an example of a cross-fertilization between the concepts of a group of companies and a group of contracts in order to find out the intention of the parties.

However, the decision of the Cour de cassation in the Orri case in 199126 shows that the reference to the concept of a group of companies is not necessary to find that a non-signatory is bound by an arbitration agreement even in a situation where the existence of such group is a fact. In this case, [Page139:] the Paris Court of Appeal27 refused to set aside an award in which the arbitrators had found that an individual was bound by an arbitration agreement signed by a company of the group he controlled. To reach that decision, the court had used its classical argument that:

"[…] an arbitration clause in an international contract has a validity and an effectiveness of its own, such that the clause must be extended to parties directly implicated in the performance of the contract and in any dispute arising out of the contract, provided that it has been established that their respective situations and activities raise the presumption that they were aware of the existence and scope of the arbitration clause, and irrespective of the fact that they did not sign the contract containing the arbitration agreement",

adding that this was 'according to the usages of international trade'. The Court of Appeal also found that the non-signatory individual was guilty of fraud, since he had hidden that he was the true contracting party, and that, as a result, the arbitrators had been right to declare that he was bound by the arbitration agreement. However, the court decided to add that this solution was further grounded in

"the concept of group of companies since it appeared that the respondent [the beneficiary of the award] had always had business relations with an individual presiding over a group of companies having a formal legal existence and independence, while being linked within an economic unit dominated by a single power."

This decision of the Paris Court of Appeal was confirmed by the Cour de cassation, but the Supreme Court did not follow the Paris Court on the grounds of usages of international trade and the concept of a group of companies. It retained the fraud as the sole reason to declare that the individual was bound by the arbitration agreement.

The prudence of the Cour de Cassation is to be approved. It is true that the existence of a group of companies is an important fact to be taken into consideration in order to decide whether non-signatories are party to an arbitration agreement. However, it is a circumstance that does not command any specific conclusion. On the contrary, the existence of a group of companies is an ambiguous indicator of the intent of the parties. It may mean that in the mind of the parties, the whole group was involved and not just the member of the group that signed the contract. However, it may also mean that the parties were aware of the existence of the group but only wanted to involve one of its members in the transaction, namely the signatory of the contract.

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In the Dow Chemical case, the Paris Court of Appeal showed that the existence of a group of companies was not a determining factor, as it was not an essential element of the decision to uphold the award that had found that non-signatory members of the group were party to the arbitration agreement. Besides the existence of a group of companies, the decisive element is the intent of the parties, which must be assessed on a case-by-case basis. The active participation of the non-signatories in the negotiation, performance and, where applicable, termination of the agreement containing the arbitration clause are the true factual elements that reveal the true intent of the parties. The existence of a group of companies often explains such active participation, just like it explains that the non-signatories were aware of the arbitration clause. However, finding out that there is a group of companies does not reveal the intent of its members to be party to an arbitration agreement that they did not sign nor does it reveal the intent of the other parties to the contract to arbitrate with the non-signatories.

b. The role of a group of companies in the case of a joinder or Consolidation

In 1992, in the Dutco case, 28 the French Court of Cassation decided that 'the principle of the equality of the parties in the appointment of the arbitrators is a matter of public policy; one cannot therefore waive it until after the dispute has arisen'. This decision led the ICC to introduce new provisions in its rules relating to multiple parties cases in 1998. As a result, Article 10 of the rules reads as follows:

"1.Where there are multiple parties, whether as Claimant or as Respondent, and where the dispute is to be referred to three arbitrators, the multiple Claimants, jointly, and the multiple Respondents, jointly, shall nominate an arbitrator for confirmation pursuant to Article 9.

2. In the absence of such a joint nomination and where all parties are unable to agree to a method for the constitution of the Arbitral Tribunal, the Court may appoint each member of the Arbitral Tribunal and shall designate one of them to act as chairman. In such case, the Court shall be at liberty to choose any person it regards as suitable to act as arbitrator, applying Article 9 when it considers this appropriate."

It is likely that this article will be amended as a result of the revision of the ICC Arbitration rules, but its application is interesting insofar as groups of companies are concerned.

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Indeed, there are many cases with multiple parties that are not necessarily true multiparty arbitrations. This is true, for example, in cases where multiple respondents are part of a group of companies under common control. It is obvious in such cases that they have identical interests in the outcome of the arbitration. Consequently, the multiple entities concerned might more properly be seen as forming, in reality, a single respondent party, and there would not seem to be any legitimate reason why they should not normally be expected to agree upon an arbitrator.

By the same token, the existence of a group of companies may also play an important role in the case of the joinder of a party to an existing procedure or the consolidation of different procedures. Among the various difficulties resulting from a request to join a party to an arbitral procedure, the fact that the arbitral tribunal may have already been constituted is a serious one. Even if the party to be joined is also a party to the arbitration agreement, it may object that it was deprived of the opportunity to participate in the constitution of the arbitral tribunal. Such an objection should not be accepted when the party concerned belongs to the same group as a party that participated in the constitution of the arbitral tribunal and actually appointed an arbitrator. Under that hypothesis, there is a strong presumption that the party to be joined was

aware of the nomination of an arbitrator by the other member of the group and had no objection to this nomination.

The same remark can be made in the case of the consolidation of two procedures. When consolidation is theoretically possible in law, one potential problem is that a party that objects to the consolidation may be tempted to block it by appointing an arbitrator who has not been appointed so far. To be more precise, let us imagine that, in a dispute concerning a contract between three parties (A, B and C), A has different claims towards B and C. B and C both nominate different arbitrators and require that two different procedures be organized. This will not be acceptable if B and C belong to the same group of companies. Having identical interests, they may be obliged to nominate the same arbitrator and participate in the same proceedings.

4. CONCLUSION

The impact of the existence of a group of companies on an arbitration procedure is very limited today. Contrary to what was briefly believed and/or desired in the last part of the twentieth century, the group of companies doctrine does not provide an objective rule to solve the difficulties relating [Page142:] to the determination of the parties to an arbitration agreement. The existence of a group of companies is nothing more than a factor to be taken into consideration to assess the intent of the parties. Moreover, it is an ambiguous factor, as opposite conclusions may be drawn from its existence, depending on the circumstances of the case concerned. However, it may play a more significant role when the intent of the parties is a decisive factor in a decision concerning a joinder or the consolidation of procedures, as the economic reality must prevail and members of the same group should not be allowed to abuse their discreet legal personalities in such cases.

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1
B. Hanotiau, Complex Arbitrations, Multiparty, Multicontract, Multi-issue and Class Actions (2005) p. 49.

2
See, for instance, the ICC award of 1988 in case No. 8910, Collection of ICC Awards 1996-2000, p. 569, note by Dominique Hascher.

3
Hascher, supra n. 2.

4
See the ICC award of 1990 in case No. 5721, Collection of ICC Awards 1986-1990, p. 400, note by Jean-Jacques Arnaldez.

5
Collection of ICC Awards 1974-1985, p. 257, note by Yves Derains.

6
Collection of ICC Awards 1974-1985, p. 263, note by Yves Derains.

7
ICC interim award of 1982 in case No. 4131, Collection of ICC Awards 1974-1985, pp. 146 and 464, note by Yves Derains.

8
Paris Court of Appeal, 21 October 1983, revue de l'arbitrage (1984) p. 98, note by A.Chapelle.

9
Pau Court of Appeal, 26 November 1986, revue de l'arbitrage (1988) p. 153, note by A.Chapelle.

10
See infra n. 27.

11
Paris Court of Appeal, 30 November 1988 and 14 February 1989, revue de l'arbitrage (1989) p. 691, note by P.Y. Tschanz.

12
Paris Court of Appeal, 28 November 1989, revue de l'arbitrage (1990) p. 675, note by P.Mayer.

13
Paris Court of Appeal, 11 January 1990, revue de l'arbitrage (1992) p. 95, note by D. Cohen.

14
French Cour de cassation, 1993, revue de l'arbitrage (1994) p. 116, note by H. Gaudemet-Tallon.

15
Hanotiau, supra n. 1 at p. 50, n. 142.

16
I. Quinata and E. de Nadal, 'Spain', in The International Comparative legal Guide to: International Arbitration 2006, p. 392, section 3.4.

17
J.F. Poudret, 'l'extension de la clause d'arbitrage: approches française et suisse', Journal du droit international (1995) p. 813 especially at p. 912.

18
Award of 24 March 2000, ASA Bulletin (2003) p. 781.

19
ASA Bulletin (1996) p. 496.

20
Swiss Federal Tribunal, 16 October 2003, revue de l'arbitrage (2004) p. 695, note by l. levy and B. Stucky.

21
Dallah real Estate and Tourism Holding Co. v. The Ministry of religious Affairs, Government of pakistan [2009] EWCA Civ. 755.

22
Hanotiau, supra n. 1, at p. 59 et seq. .

23
863 F. 2d (4th Cir. 1988).

24
Paris Court of Appeal, 31 October 1989, revue de l'arbitrage (1992) p. 90, note by l. Aynès.

25
See supra n. 9.

26
Cour de cassation, 11 June 1991, revue de l'arbitrage (1992) p. 73, note by D. Cohen.

27
Paris Court of Appeal, 11 January 1990, revue de l'arbitrage (1992) p. 106, note by D. Cohen.

28
Cour de cassation, 7 January 1992, revue de l'arbitrage (1992) p. 470, note by p. Bellet.